Category Archives: Paris Agreement

Read all about it!? Media, accountability and the Paris Agreement on climate change

As the curtains closed on the 22nd Conference of the Parties (COP22) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Marrakech in November 2016, we can soon analyse how much media attention it raised. One could imagine that the unprecedented speed of ratification of the Paris Agreement leading to its entry into force on 4 November would turn media’s eyes towards Marrakech to scrutinize how governments are starting to turn words in a treaty into action – or not? While we do not have data on media coverage of COP22, it is likely to be significantly lower than for COP21 when the worlds’ eyes were on Paris.

One reason is surely that it overlapped with the presidential election in the US. Other reasons, however, are likely more systemic to the way the media works. This has important implications for the role it can play in ensuring governments keep the promises they made in Paris.



In a recently published study we were interested in the role media can play in public accountability in global climate governance.[1] Accountability in general terms involves a social relationship between someone who should be answerable for his/her actions (accountee) towards someone else (account holder). Public accountability involves the ability of citizens to hold at least their own (and possibly other) governments to account for their (lack of) actions. In our case we were interested in the role of media in enabling public accountability of the goals on climate change that states develop together with other states. Strong public accountability could strengthen both the democratic legitimacy of global climate governance and keep the pressure on governments to implement their commitments. This is important as governments are not very keen to hold each other to account for implementation – also not in the Paris Agreement.[2]

The starting point for our study was that an active media coverage of and media commentary on key meetings in global climate governance is one indicator of media’s role in holding governments to account for the promises they make in these meetings – most lately through adopting the Paris Agreement.[3] We analysed coverage in leading newspapers in seven countries (Finland, India, Laos, Norway, South Africa, UK and USA) of key meetings in global climate governance including, COP meetings, in the period 2004-2009.[4] We counted both the total number of articles written about the meetings and how many of those articles were commentaries in the form of editorials, opinion pieces and the like. Our interest in commentaries is due to their association with a part of the public sphere that still allows space for longer evaluation of arguments and evidence.

The study shows that newspaper coverage was limited or absent for meetings that were not:

  • attended by Heads of State;
  • the launch of a new process or;
  • linked to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

The pattern of coverage differs significantly among individual newspapers with no clear distinction between developed and developing country papers. Among the UNFCCC meetings, the COPs most covered were those where major negotiation mandates or a new agreement were expected. Unsurprisingly media engages easier with events that can be sold as ‘new’ in some respect, compared to either the negotiation meetings preparing for them or subsequent meetings that focus on implementation and follow-up. For example, COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009 had very high coverage, in contrast to COP14 in Poznan the preceding year where there was still time to provide significant input.protest

The very low coverage by traditional media of the more ‘boring’ meetings prior to or after the launching of a new negotiation mandate or a new agreement poses a significant obstacle to the potential for traditional media to contribute to the public accountability on if and how governments will meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Social media plays a much bigger role now than in our study period. However, the traditional news media has in parallel moved online and its articles are spread through Twitter and other platforms, merging the two media.

The five year cycles in which states should submit their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) is a key building block of the Paris Agreement. However, if these cycles are to become virtuous, with mutual encouragement among countries to promise deeper emission cuts, the public, through both traditional and social media, need to follow the issues and support such increased ambition. Society would therefore serve the Paris Agreement well if it keeps journalists and editors on their toes and makes it clear there is an audience for well-informed critical analysis of how well governments keep their promises.



Sylvia Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, Assistant professor, Public Administration and Policy, Wageningen University and member of Climate Strategies



[1] The methodology and results can be found in Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, S. I., et al. (2016). “Read all about it!? Public accountability, fragmented global climate governance and the media.” Climate Policy. DOI

[2] Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, S. and H. Van Asselt (2015). Strengthening Accountability under the 2015 Climate Change Agreement. Policy Brief no 2, Climate Strategies, London. Available at 

[3] Another route is the activities of (trans)national non-governmental organizations who follow these processes and scrutinize the actions of governments within and outside them, see Steffek, J. (2010). “Public Accountability and the Public Sphere of International Governance.” Ethics & International Affairs 24(1): 45-68.

[4] The methodology and results can be found in Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, S. I., et al. (2016). “Read all about it!? Public accountability, fragmented global climate governance and the media.” Climate Policy.

Lessons from European Climate Monitoring Crucial for Paris Agreement Success

By Jonas Schoenefeld, Mikael Hildén and Andy Jordan

As the 22nd session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 22) in Marrakech draws to a close, it is becoming increasingly clear that credible monitoring and transparency procedures are urgently needed. Otherwise national pledges to address climate change in the spirit of the 2015 Paris Agreement will not build sufficient global trust.

The 2015 Paris Agreement marked a shift towards countries making emission reduction pledges known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and a new Transparency Framework (Article 13). This framework requires regular progress reports on pledges to address climate change. While the quick ratification of the Paris Agreement is a sign that the international community is eager to make progress, setting up a strong and effective transparency framework will likely require hard and sustained work for years to come.

Our new research, published today in Climate Policy, shows that the long term success of the Agreement depends on the availability of well-designed and functioning monitoring and review mechanisms. The EU has one of the most advanced climate policy monitoring systems in the world – but it still encounters persistent challenges that, crucially, could jeopardize the implementation of the Paris Agreement if these challenges persist within the EU and potentially also in other countries and regions. We show that the EU’s current approach to monitoring climate policies – largely borrowed from monitoring greenhouse gases, which is a vastly different task – has not supported in depth learning and debate on the performance of individual policies. Other important obstacles include political concerns over the costs of reporting, control, and the perceived usefulness of the information produced. The international community should therefore draw on the EU’s valuable experiences and also difficulties in monitoring climate policies in order to develop the practice further.

A vital part of the implementation of the Paris Agreement will hinge on whether political actors can muster the leadership in order to successfully navigate these monitoring challenges at the international level. Monitoring is probably the most underestimated challenge in implementing the Paris Agreement. In the past, it has been seen as a technical, data gathering task. We show that it is anything but a mere reporting exercise. Implementing more advanced monitoring at the international level will require substantial political efforts, resources, and leadership. In order to justify investments in monitoring and evaluation to the public, care needs to be taken to ensure that monitoring information is used effectively to evaluate and improve policy, rather than as a weapon to lay blame when things slip.

A key strength of the Paris Agreement is that so many countries are part of it and are willing to engage. Disengagement or even withdrawal could therefore imperil the whole Agreement and have grave ramifications for the set-up of a strong monitoring system. The EU’s experience shows that recognising the role of public policies in the NDCs should thus be seen as one step in a long journey to deeper understanding of what climate policies achieve and how policies can be improved.

This blog post has also been published on Environmental Europe and on the INOGOV Blog.

Climate Finance: Time to Know Who Gives What

By Romain Weikmans and Timmons Roberts

As the first climate change negotiations after December’s landmark Paris Agreement  open in Bonn this week,  controversies around levels of funding for poorer countries to fight climate change may re-emerge. The absence of internationally-agreed accounting rules for climate finance makes it harder to establish whether promises are being met and which countries are doing their part.  Most debates also confound two purposes of climate finance accounting – whether it is about developed countries’ financial efforts toward developing nations or about assessing the broader question of how much financial resources are being devoted to fighting climate change. So what can be done about it?

Wealthy nations claim they have delivered on promises of ‘Fast Start Finance’, and that they are on a legitimate path to the US$ 100 billion per year goal for 2020. Fast Start Finance refers to  ‘new and additional’ financial resources approaching US$ 30 billion during 2010-2012. This promise was made by developed countries at the contentious Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), held in Copenhagen in 2009. There, developed countries also collectively pledged to mobilise US$ 100 billion per year by 2020, with balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation. Those financial commitments were reiterated in subsequent COP decisions, including in the Cancun Agreements (see Paragraph 98) and during the Paris Climate Conference in December 2015 – when the US$ 100 billion mobilisation goal was extended to 2025 (see Paragraph 54).

However, activists, researchers, other observers and developing countries all dispute the amounts developed countries say they have given in climate finance. Contrasting statements on the fulfilment of climate finance promises made by developed and developing countries’ representatives and by civil society observers are rendered possible by the absence of internationally-agreed accounting rules. These should also permit meaningful comparisons between developed countries’ performance with regard to the provision of climate finance, but they currently fail to do so. The COP 21 Paris decision document and this year’s negotiations provide a key opportunity to set this problem right.

For Two Purposes, One System Won’t Do

As highlighted in our recent Climate Strategies Policy Brief, the OECD’s Rio Markers methodology forms the basis of the current climate finance accounting system used by most developed countries to report to the UNFCCC. However, this methodology is not well suited for the assessment of contributing countries’ financial effort toward adaptation and mitigation in developing countries. In addition, most debates around climate finance accounting confound two purposes which are quite different.

The first approach to accounting for climate finance flows stresses the fact that the developed nations created the problem of climate change, and that they also are the ones with the resources to help developing nations avoid increasing their emissions and deal with the impacts already occurring from a destabilized climate system. In this view it is critical to prove that funding is coming from wealthy nation governments and that this funding is actually being delivered, as specified under various provisions in the UNFCCC Convention, in the Paris Agreement, and in multiple other decisions. Under this approach the implicit or explicit purpose of the climate finance accounting system is to account for developed countries’ financial effort toward developing countries.

A second and very different approach argues that it doesn’t matter much to know where the money comes from, but rather that to address climate change we need to “shift the trillions” of private and public investors to drive a green energy revolution and shift toward climate-resilient development pathways, both in poor and rich countries. In this approach the aim of the climate finance accounting system is to assess the scale of financial resources globally devoted to the fight against climate change.

These approaches vary by their aims, the parts of the Paris Agreement they align with, which flows they focus upon, whether the flows need to be public grants and concessional (i.e., low interest) loans or can also be “mobilised” private finance, whether non-concessional loans and export credits can count, how granular data needs to be, and whether self-reporting is seen as adequate. We call these approaches “meeting financial obligations” (Approach 1) and “Tracking resilient/low carbon finance” (Approach 2).

Table 1: Climate Finance Accounting Systems: Different Purposes, Different Features

Aim of the accounting system Assessing the financial effort made by developed countries toward developing ones Assessing the financial resources devoted to mitigation/adaptation
Climate finance objective/rationale USD 30 billion for 2010-12 (Fast Start Finance)

USD 100 billion/year by 2020

“Shifting the trillions”
Implicit goal of climate finance Financial transfers between rich/highly polluting countries to low polluters and/or most vulnerable/poor countries Transition to a low carbon and climate resilient economy
Main relevant provisions under the UNFCCC Paris Agreement “Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention” (Art. 9.1). “Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development” (Art. 2 (c)).
Flows Only North-South flows

(So it’s important to determine who are the contributors and who are the beneficiaries)

Domestic and international flows (North-South flows; North-North flows; South-South flows)

(It’s less important to differentiate between contributors and beneficiaries)

Effort sharing between contributing countries Very important Less important
“Provided” versus “mobilised” Provided climate finance Mobilised climate finance
Focus on public/private flows Public flows Public and private flows
Underlying Accounting System
Additionality  (above existing aid) Very important Not important
Concessionality (grants or low-interest loans) Very important Not important
Grant equivalent/budget effort versus face value Grant equivalent/budget effort Face value
Granularity Very important: Only components, sub-components, elements or proportions of projects can be reported as “climate finance” Possibly less important
Accounting based on intention or proven impact? In theory: proven impact, but this has not really been discussed under the UNFCCC.

The focus has rather been on the intention (of mitigation/adaptation). This is categorized by simple declaration of contributors (of funding as climate related or not), but some intervention types could be excluded (for example support to “high efficiency” coal plants).

Control on self-reporting Very important: Could be for example achieved through triple validation (by the donor and by the recipient country, and/or by an independent board or its agent) Less important; This approach relies more on existing large datasets (e.g., foreign direct investments, export credits, Bloomberg New Energy Finance data).

Source: Fit for Purpose: Negotiating the New Climate Finance Accounting Systems.

Both approaches are important for different sets of reasons. However, when it comes to designing an accounting system, the worst outcome is one that mixes the two and results in modalities that are inappropriate for the underlying purpose of each approach.

A Window of Opportunity

Little noted in the Paris Decision text is a call for the elaboration under the UNFCCC of “modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilised through public interventions” (see Paragraph 57). Such modalities will be “considered” in December 2018 and could lead to the adoption of a recommendation by the COP. Such a decision is long overdue and should be celebrated. However, in agreeing to postpone to 2018 the formal consideration of such a framework, negotiators implicitly accepted that we will continue to live in what we have described as a “Wild West” of climate finance for the next three years, at least.

In their efforts to develop accounting modalities for the 2018 deadline (see box 1 for a proposed timeline), we call on UNFCCC negotiators to acknowledge the fundamentally different features of the accounting system associated with each approach described, and to develop climate finance information systems that are truly fit for purpose.

Box 1. Proposed timeline for the development of modalities by 2018

§  May 2016: Agreement of work programme for developing modalities for accounting climate finance

§  Nov 2016: Details of work programme and update from SBSTA to the COP

§  Jan-Feb 2017: Parties submissions due for proposed language

§  May 2017: COP combines submissions into zero order draft text

§  Nov 2017: Draft text developed

§  May 2018: Draft text debated

§  Nov 2018: Draft modalities proposed to Parties: agreement on a recommendation to the CMA

§  CMA 1: Consideration and adoption of the recommendation by the CMA

Source: Fit for Purpose: Negotiating the New Climate Finance Accounting Systems.

Romain Weikmans is Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Climate and Development Lab, Brown University and Fellow of the Belgian American Educational Foundation. Timmons Roberts is Ittleson Professor of Environmental Studies and Sociology at Brown University, USA and a Climate Strategies member.