Category Archives: Politics

Living in a Material World: A Win-Win for Improving Energy Efficiency?

By Kate Scott, Katy Roelich, Anne Owen and John Barrett (University of Leeds, UK)

Understanding the role of materials in the supply chain can give us a truer picture of global emissions, as well as increased efficiency and reduced costs.

The EU’s ‘Hidden’ Carbon Footprint

An 80-95% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions produced within the EU by 2050 from 1990 may sound impressive, but it is not the whole story, as we discuss in a new paper published in Climate Policy: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14693062.2017.1333949.

There is more than one way to calculate national carbon footprints and the way emissions are currently counted casts EU countries in a favourable light. Climate targets focus on greenhouse gases produced within the EU, not those required to support the consumption of its residents. While emissions produced within the EU’s territory – by its factories, power plants, buildings, cars and so on – are declining, emissions driven by EU consumption are rising.

Greenouse gases become embodied in products as energy is used, transforming raw materials into buildings, clothes, phones or cars. Some of these materials and products will be mined and manufactured abroad, and the EU imports more than it exports. As a result, the EU ‘consumes’ about 40% more emissions than it produces. 

In our research, we looked across the whole EU supply chain (including overseas territory) to see where greenhouse gases are expended in the materials, transportation, construction, use, disposal and replacement of everything from buildings and cars to furniture and packaging. We calculated how many of these emissions are included/excluded from existing EU climate policies and whether policies could be extended to capture additional emissions as materials are transformed into products. Cutting carbon along product supply chains can also reduce production costs, so addressing the full supply chain emissions could realise cost savings too.

Climate Policies Neglect Supply Chain Opportunities

The EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is not doing enough to incentivise low carbon innovations in energy intensive industries and even if it was effective, the industries it addresses only produce 45% of the EU’s emissions. Alongside renewable energy targets, the EU’s climate package relies on energy efficiency measures to deliver its climate targets. Energy efficiency standards have made progress in reducing the energy consumed when using electronic goods, heating buildings and driving cars (i.e. in use). Yet this does not address all the energy needed to produce the EU’s homes, cars, phones, roads, food etc.

Taking a closer look at buildings and cars purchased by EU residents: the EU’s Building Performance Directive tackles the energy efficiency of buildings in use. However, an equivalent amount of the carbon used to heat buildings (i.e. in use) is used in their construction. Whilst 30% of the supply chain emissions are produced in sectors covered by the EU ETS (mainly power and material processing sectors), and are arguably addressed by existing climate policies, 30% sit outside EU climate policy altogether.

 

For cars, we can see that nearly three quarters of the supply chain carbon is emitted when driving (i.e. in-use) and subject to energy efficiency standards. All in all, however, 20% is left outside the scope of EU climate policy.

Extending European Energy Efficiency Standards to Include Material Use

This same analysis we have applied to cars and buildings can equally be applied to appliances, electronics, furniture, clothes, packaging etc. Their supply chains emit the equivalent of 40% of EU production emissions, with two thirds completely outside the scope of existing policies. Therefore there is significant potential for EU product policies to address climate change in this area.

Energy efficiency regulations and standards could be extended to include embodied emissions. For example, the Ecodesign Directive, the EU’s tool to improve the energy efficiency of electronics and appliances,  does have a mechanism to address some aspects of embodied emissions, including promoting easy to repair designs which would reduce emissions embodied in material use. However, this was introduced when embodied emissions data was sparse and of poor quality. Without mandatory material efficiency standards this has not been utilised.

By addressing material efficiency alongside energy efficiency our research indicates that these measures can enhance the policy package for climate mitigation. There is however work to be done on designing the right policies to exploit these opportunities and this needs to be underpinned by a mainstreaming of knowledge of embodied emissions flows into policy, as well as research. In the ideal scenario we can provide a truer picture of the EU’s carbon footprint while simultaneously uncovering ways to substantially reduce it and save costs in the process.

About the Authors

 

Kate Scott is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Industrial Energy, Materials and Products (CIE-MAP), at the University of Leeds.

 

 

Katy Roelich is a University Academic Fellow in the School of Earth and Environment and School of Civil Engineering, at the University of Leeds.

 

 

Anne Owen is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Industrial Energy, Materials and Products (CIE-MAP), at the University of Leeds.

 

 

John Barrett is Professor and Director of the Centre for Industrial Energy, Materials and Products (CIE-MAP), at the University of Leeds.

Non-State Actors are Here to Stay, but Delivery Mechanisms Need Improvement

By Fatemeh Bakhtiari

The surge in transnational governance schemes led by non-state actors can be traced back to the incipient globalisation that followed the liberalisation of trade markets in the mid-1970s. These schemes provide public goods, thus complementing – and sometimes replacing – traditional, state actor-led governance schemes. A diverse set of reasons move non-state actors to engage in these schemes: philanthropy, influence policy, avoid regulation, first-mover benefits, and public relations are among the main such reasons. The Climate Alliance, a coalition of sub-national governments founded in 1990, is possibly the doyen of non-state actor-led transnational governance schemes focused on climate change.

The UNFCCC, the main state actor-led governance scheme in the area of climate change, recognises the potential role that non-state actors may play with regard to achieving the goals of the Convention. Most recently, it does so through the Paris Agreement, which “resolves to strengthen” the existing technical examination process on mitigation, including by improving access to, and participation in, this process by developing country non-Party experts (paragraph 110), and “welcomes the efforts of non-Party stakeholders to scale up their climate actions” (paragraph 118). For all practical purposes, today non-sate actor actions are seen as a valid, and indeed much needed, addition to state actor-led climate change mitigation efforts. Put bluntly, non-state actor actions have risen sharply in the political agenda partly because state actor-led action falls seriously below the levels that would be required to achieve the goals of the Convention.

Yet, as argued in a new paper published in Climate Policy, little is known about the efficiency and effectiveness of non-state actor action in the area of climate change. Critical questions, for which only partial answers exist at best, include:

  • What level of emission reductions can be attributed to non-state actor actions?
  • To what extent do emission reductions attributed to non-state actor actions overlap with emission reductions attributed to state actor actions?
  • At what cost do non-state actor actions reduce emissions of greenhouse gases?
  • Do non-state actor actions attract more private-sector funds, compared to state actor actions?
  • Do non-state actor actions spur, or stifle, state actor actions?

Against this background, it seems legitimate to question whether the political rationale for promoting non-state actor actions is warranted. Specifically, and in light of the scant objective evidence that is currently available, two issues deserve consideration. Firstly, the appropriateness of institutionalising non-state actor actions, without any associated transparency requirements. Secondly, the opportunity cost associated with public (and private) sector funding of non-state actor actions.

Transparency requirements

Beyond the rhetoric of “strengthening” the technical examination process through non-state actor participation, and “welcoming” increased efforts on the part of non-state actors, the UNFCCC will have to introduce basic accountability requirements on these actors. These requirements are essential, if non-sate actor actions are to be embedded in the international climate change regime in a structured manner, and they are to make a sizeable contribution to it. In practice, this means that basic monitoring and reporting requirements would have to be agreed to, and met. For most non-state actor actions, such requirements would undermine their main raisons d’être – namely the lack of oversight, and the non-committal nature of their objectives. Therefore, from this point of view, increased institutionalisation of non-state actor actions is likely to be challenging.

Opportunity costs

While it is clear that public funds contribute to financing non-state actor actions, the overall amounts of public funds invested, and the share that these amounts represent, vis-à-vis the total ‘budget’ of non-state actor actions, are not known. In the likely event that these public sector funds are not additional – in the sense that they ‘displace’ funding that would have otherwise been invested in other, related activities – it is legitimate to question whether these public funds are better used through non-state actor actions, as opposed to state actor actions. The question is not whether public funds should be directed to non-state actor actions, but rather how efficient and effective non-state actor actions are, compared to ‘equivalent’ state actor-led actions. The relevance of this question increases with both the political and (public sector) budgetary stakes associated with the institutionalisation of non-state actor actions.

 

Fatemeh Bakhtiari is a researcher at the UNEP DTU Partnership, Department of Management Engineering, Technical University of Denmark in Copenhagen, Denmark.

Five Ways to Address Fossil Fuel Subsidies through the WTO and International Trade Agreements

By Peter Wooders (IISD) and Cleo Verkuijl (SEI)

Can the international trade system be a catalyst for reforming fossil fuel subsidies (FFS) to help relieve the burden on the public purse, reduce local and global air pollution, improve energy security and tackle climate change?

Oil-drilling platform in the Brent Field, North Sea. Photo credit: UN Photo/Exxon Photo via Flickr (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

This was the theme of a recent workshop set at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva and organised by Climate Strategies, the Stockholm Environment Institute and the International Institute for Sustainable Development. The event forms part of a broader conversation on how the international trading system can be made compatible with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change.


Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform in Context

  • Annual expenditure on fossil fuel subsidies has been estimated at US$320 billion for consumers in developing and emerging countries in 2015, and at US$100 billion for fossil fuel production worldwide.
  • Fossil fuel subsidy reform can free up significant funds towards meeting the SDGs.
  • Encouraging examples from India and Indonesia show that today’s low oil prices form an opportunity to redirect public spending on oil, coal and gas towards development priorities such as education, health, infrastructure and access to clean and reliable energy.
  • Reform is also vital piece of the climate change puzzle, with the potential to cut greenhouse gas emissions by more than 10% by 2020.
  • By complementing and strengthening ongoing reform efforts, the international trading system can be a key enabler of the 2030 Agenda.
  • Reform should adequately address the needs and concerns of developing countries, including those related to energy access.

Participants found there is significant scope for the WTO and international trade agreements to complement and strengthen reform efforts already being supported under a range of international forums, including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the G20 and APEC (the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation).

Fossil Fuel Subsidies and the WTO: “A Missed Opportunity”

Owing to its wide membership, its central role in disciplining trade-distorting subsidies across economic sectors, and its well-established dispute settlement system, the WTO is well-equipped to take the FFS reform agenda forward.

To date, however, the Organization’s involvement on FFS has been limited. In notable contrast with the various disputes against renewable energy subsidies that have been launched at the WTO over the past decade, no FFS have been disputed thus far. In part this is because many WTO Members do not fully notify their FFS, whether because of a lack of data and understanding of energy subsidies and their trade effects, current shortfalls in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’ (ASCM) notification questionnaire or a lack of mechanisms to enforce notification. In the absence of case law and targeted research, there is also a lack of legal clarity on the extent to which different types of FFS can be disciplined by the ASCM to begin with.

And yet addressing this topic falls squarely within the Organization’s mandate. FFS can have a range of distorting impacts on trade and investment, including by affecting the rate and timing of development of new fields or mines.

Moreover, the WTO was established with a view to ensuring economic progress is achieved in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, and the SDGs explicitly identify trade as a critically important means of implementation. As such, trade should be viewed as an enabler for achieving the SDGs and targets, including the objective of reducing FFS set out under SDG 12.

Although parallels should not be overstated, it is also worth noting the WTO’s continued engagement on reducing environmentally harmful fisheries subsidies as part of the Doha Round. Observing the discrepancy in how the two subsidies were treated in the WTO, the former Director-General Pascal Lamy characterised the absence of FFS from the WTO’s agenda as a “missed opportunity”.

What Can Be Done?

During the Geneva workshop, participants identified multiple avenues to address FFS within the international trading system. While not purporting to be exhaustive, the table below identifies five key categories of action available to WTO Members: 1) Promote capacity building and technical cooperation; 2) Enhance transparency; 3) Adopt subsidy reform pledges and ensure credible follow-up through reporting and review; 4) Clarify the interpretation of existing rules; and 5) Make changes to existing rules. Several concrete pathways to help realise these goals are also identified.

Table 1: Five Ways to Address Fossil Fuel Subsidies at the WTO

It is important to note that these pathways are not mutually exclusive, and many are likely to be particularly effective if adopted together. A pledge, report and review system, for instance, would benefit from parallel efforts to improve transparency.

All approaches would necessarily be led by WTO Members. They range from those that are purely voluntary to those that are binding, and embedded in the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. This provides scope for gradual enhancements of ambition.

In a similar vein, many approaches can either be taken forward plurilaterally (by a coalition of the willing) or multilaterally (involving all WTO Members). As illustrated by references to fossil fuel subsidy reduction in the EU-Singapore Free-Trade Agreement (which is awaiting formal approval), bilateral and regional trade agreements may form an effective platform to pioneer cooperative approaches on fossil fuel subsidy reform.

The workshop also made clear that any successful effort to address FFS through the international trade system will need to adequately address the special circumstances of developing countries. That might involve special and differential treatment provisions, including potential exemptions and carve-outs for development, energy access and other reasons.

With the WTO’s 11th biennial Ministerial Conference coming up in Buenos Aires in December this year, creative thinking, constructive debate, and further research on the various options on the table is needed to help ensure the promise of Paris and the SDGs is fulfilled.

 

This blog is part of a larger Climate Strategies project: ‘Making the International Trade System work for Climate Change‘. More information can be found of the project webpage.

This blog is also available on both the SEI and IISD websites.

 

About the Authors

 

Peter Wooders is Group Director of Energy at the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD).

 

 

 

Cleo Verkuijl is Research Fellow of Climate Change Policy at the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI).

Liability for Loss and Damage from Climate Change

By Elisabeth Gsottbauer and Robert Gampfer

The question whether countries can be held liable for climate change damages has become an important issue in the UN climate negotiations. The discussion currently revolves around fairness in the light of historical responsibility and possibilities how to finance effective loss and damage. In a new paper published this week in Climate Policy, we argue that a liability mechanism including compensation could also help countries to agree upon and enforce more ambitious emission reductions.

Loss and damage from Hurricane Matthew in Haiti, 2016 (Photo by Igor Rugwiza: flickr.com/photos/minustah /)

The average number of natural catastrophes and natural disaster losses has sharply increased in 2016. Most scientists attribute a great part of this increase to climate change. Overall, economic loss and damage from natural disasters in 2016 totaled around US$ 175 billion, and were at their highest for four years [1]. Impacts have been particularly devastating in poor, developing countries. At the same time, climate change is commonly attributed mostly to the high carbon emissions of the past two centuries in rich, industrialized countries.

Rules for Loss & Damage: justice and effectiveness

Due to this responsibility gap, developing countries are pushing a mechanism to deal with loss and damage including clear compensation rules [2]. Those efforts originate in the idea that developed nations can be held liable for climate change-related damages based on their historical responsibility for carbon emissions. Loss and damage is often seen as a means to restore “climate justice” between developing and developed countries [3].

Although loss and damage has been a subject of debate among Parties to the UNFCCC for years, the Paris Agreement was the first to devote a full article to loss and damage [4]. While presently the article provides no basis for any legal liability or financial compensation, we argue, the existence of a compensation mechanism could also help to achieve more ambitious climate cooperation and thus more effective climate policies. Developing countries might be more willing to reduce their own emissions and invest in adaptation when industrialized countries acknowledge their historical responsibility by signing up to a liability mechanism. Industrialized countries in turn might reduce their emissions further, because they see developing countries also willing to share in the payment for climate protection and want to avoid paying compensation if climate change continues unchecked.

How liability rules can help to reduce emissions

We tested this premise in an online experiment with more than 1200 participants from the US and India. We designed a “game” where players were grouped into pairs, with one player having a higher starting capital than the other, mirroring the rich and poor nations divide. Each player decided whether to invest a part of their capital into climate protection. Via their investment, players could reduce the probability of a climate catastrophe able to negatively affect the capital endowment of the poorer player.

We imposed different liability rules for different groups of player pairs. We found that without any liability rule, few players decided to invest in climate protection. With a “strict liability” rule forcing the rich player to compensate the poor player for any damages, substantially more rich players chose to invest – but only few poor players. In two other groups we introduced distinct “negligence” liability rules: only if the rich player had not invested in climate protection did she have to compensate the poor player; or the poor player could only receive compensation if she had also invested in climate protection. These two groups achieved the highest reductions in the likelihood for climate damages, with most rich and poor players investing in climate protection. Importantly, this outcome also meant that in these two groups very few poor players actually suffered damages, and very few rich players had to pay compensation. Negligence liability rules were thus most likely to lead to an effective “micro climate agreement” in our experiment.

Looking ahead

Our results suggest that policymakers would be well advised to further intensify negotiations on a compensation mechanism for loss and damage in preparation for the 23rd session of the UNFCCC conference (COP 23) by the end of this year. The Fijian presidency may help to sharpen the focus and expand the scope of loss and damage and establish more stringent institutional arrangements as small island states such as Fiji are at the forefront of climate change impacts.

Indeed, we find that a rather simple negligence rule makes cooperation more attractive and rewarding, leading rich and poor nations to boost their investments in mitigation and adaptation for climate protection. Far from opening up a Pandora’s box of endless compensation claims towards industrialized countries, a liability mechanism could make global climate cooperation more effective and less costly in the longer run.

 

About the authors

Elisabeth Gsottbauer, Post-doc at the Institute of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck (Further information on the author https://sites.google.com/site/elisabethgsottbauer/)

 

 

Robert Gampfer, Completed his PhD at the research group for International Political Economy, ETH Zurich (Further information on the author https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Robert_Gampfer)

 

References

[1] Munich Re, 4. January 2017

[2] UNFCCC Loss&Damage

[3] Loss&DamageNet

[4] Paris Agreement, Article 8

*This blog post originated from an earlier version published online at ETH Zukunftsblog, 19.08.2014

 

 

Lessons from European Climate Monitoring Crucial for Paris Agreement Success

By Jonas Schoenefeld, Mikael Hildén and Andy Jordan

As the 22nd session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 22) in Marrakech draws to a close, it is becoming increasingly clear that credible monitoring and transparency procedures are urgently needed. Otherwise national pledges to address climate change in the spirit of the 2015 Paris Agreement will not build sufficient global trust.

The 2015 Paris Agreement marked a shift towards countries making emission reduction pledges known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and a new Transparency Framework (Article 13). This framework requires regular progress reports on pledges to address climate change. While the quick ratification of the Paris Agreement is a sign that the international community is eager to make progress, setting up a strong and effective transparency framework will likely require hard and sustained work for years to come.

Our new research, published today in Climate Policy, shows that the long term success of the Agreement depends on the availability of well-designed and functioning monitoring and review mechanisms. The EU has one of the most advanced climate policy monitoring systems in the world – but it still encounters persistent challenges that, crucially, could jeopardize the implementation of the Paris Agreement if these challenges persist within the EU and potentially also in other countries and regions. We show that the EU’s current approach to monitoring climate policies – largely borrowed from monitoring greenhouse gases, which is a vastly different task – has not supported in depth learning and debate on the performance of individual policies. Other important obstacles include political concerns over the costs of reporting, control, and the perceived usefulness of the information produced. The international community should therefore draw on the EU’s valuable experiences and also difficulties in monitoring climate policies in order to develop the practice further.

A vital part of the implementation of the Paris Agreement will hinge on whether political actors can muster the leadership in order to successfully navigate these monitoring challenges at the international level. Monitoring is probably the most underestimated challenge in implementing the Paris Agreement. In the past, it has been seen as a technical, data gathering task. We show that it is anything but a mere reporting exercise. Implementing more advanced monitoring at the international level will require substantial political efforts, resources, and leadership. In order to justify investments in monitoring and evaluation to the public, care needs to be taken to ensure that monitoring information is used effectively to evaluate and improve policy, rather than as a weapon to lay blame when things slip.

A key strength of the Paris Agreement is that so many countries are part of it and are willing to engage. Disengagement or even withdrawal could therefore imperil the whole Agreement and have grave ramifications for the set-up of a strong monitoring system. The EU’s experience shows that recognising the role of public policies in the NDCs should thus be seen as one step in a long journey to deeper understanding of what climate policies achieve and how policies can be improved.

This blog post has also been published on Environmental Europe and on the INOGOV Blog.

What Next for Building an EU Energy Union?

By Michael Grubb and Kacper Szulecki

A new Special Issue of the Climate Policy Journal focuses on the governance of European climate change efforts.  Drawing on the insights, Michael Grubb and Kacper Szulecki argue that a huge opportunity could be grasped in the form of a New Energy Union. The outcome of the UK’s referendum illustrates the need for it to be viewed not as a technocratic venture but an economic and political opportunity.

Energy is the lifeblood of society. It heats our homes, powers our industry and entertainment, and fuels our transport. It became yet another negative punchbag in the UK Referendum campaign, with claims and counterclaims about costs. But there is a simple and very positive story to be told.

Some sixty-five years ago, after the devastation of World War II, the European Coal and Steel Community provided the vision, the coordination, and the investment that fuelled an unparalleled period of growth and stability in Europe. It laid the foundations for what then became the European Communities, the EEC and then the European Union. But ironically the energy sector got left behind.

Now is the time to update the vision. The great strength of that original Community was not to obsess about sovereignty, but to focus on a real, substantial and urgent task that required collective action. At long last, EU countries have initiated an Energy Union. It started from perhaps unexpected quarters, as Poland sought a unified European response to concerns about their excessive dependence on Russian gas. But the solution is not to go back to the dirty fuels of past centuries. Europe’s energy future can be clean, diverse, secure, and interconnected.

The old ways of energy production, emitting 40 billion tonnes of heat-trapping gases every year, are slowly choking our planet. Last year was the hottest on record; the Arctic ice has continued long-term decline in volume, with the lowest ever extent this Spring.  Fortunately, the solutions are at our fingertips.  Within less than a decade, the cost of solar energy has halved, that of wind has fallen by a third, batteries by 60%, and some technologies for energy efficiency by even more.  Crucially, the costs of both electricity system management and long distance transmission have also fallen.

What that means is that we can have radically new energy systems, combining localised generation and storage with larger resources and backup pooled across regions. But there is a catch. The cost reductions to date have been driven by the collective impact of national efforts, including those in the framework of the EU’s commitment to get 20% of its energy from renewables by 2020. Europe is on course to deliver that goal and it has driven the creation of new industries and scale economies.

The next stage will be harder. Going much further requires a more integrated effort with more connected energy systems. The wind does not blow (or cease to) everywhere at the same time across the continent. The biggest and best resources are scattered in different corners of Europe, and the vast swathes of the North Sea, the Baltic and parts of the Mediterranean.  The sun’s track from east to west can help solar output to smooth morning and evening peaks, but far more important is the difference between north and south, and across the seasons.

We will need transmission lines to harvest that huge renewable potential. The EU has set a modest 10% interconnection target for national electricity systems to meet, but even that will require some efforts. As well as ensuring security and capacity, coordination between Member States will need to monitor the impact connecting different national systems may have on overall carbon dioxide emissions. Joint efforts need not end at EU borders; neighbouring regions such as North Africa and the Balkans could also be invited to the trans-continental effort.

We will need storage of both electricity and gas. Gas is much cleaner than coal, and we can use our gas infrastructure and storage further in the future as we move towards ‘greener gas’ – for example producing hydrogen from surplus wind and solar output and injecting it into gas grids.

Our gas systems complement each other: central European dependence on Russia is matched by British dependence on the Middle East, so conjoined, each can help the other. As our own gas reserves decline, the North Sea also offers wind, waves and capacity to store both gas and perhaps carbon dioxide, as well as connections to Scandinavian hydro-electricity storage.

The economic value of the industries will be immense. An investment programme along these lines could offer a real and significant contribution to European economic recovery. A UK House of Lords enquiry concurred that channelling badly-needed investment into such real assets, which deliver unambiguous economic returns well above prevalent interest rates, would enhance future economic productivity as well as provide short-term economic stimulus.  And the savings arising from fully integrated approaches in energy by 2030 have been estimated at up to €50-80bn/yr by 2030 – hundreds of Euros per household.  But all that needs an integrated approach, and investor confidence grounded in a clear European vision, strategy and collaboration.

So there is one big catch: politics, most fervently on display in the UK Referendum.  Cost-benefit analyses with abstract ‘social welfare’ end up subordinate when political considerations take centre stage. Furthermore, different varieties of capitalism across Europe make the calculus of cost and the distribution of benefits differ between markets. But a coordinated effort on a Europe-wide scale can be made beneficial for everyone.

The UK  could still aspire to play a great role in building this future. It has leading energy expertise, superb wind resources, and is well on our way to doubling its electricity interconnections with the continent, to benefit from cheaper prices on the continent through cable which have proven to be amongst the most reliable sources of power (Figure 2), helping to ‘keep the lights on’ in recent winters of tight UK supply. Though it would clearly be easier to provide this within the EU, UK engagement will remain mutually beneficial to the effort, even if a UK departure may preclude it from some of the benefits. Norway’s example shows that however complicated a country’s relationship with the EU may be, energy cooperation can offer pragmatic solutions for mutual benefit.

The challenges then are governance to provide confidence and clarity, with a strategy to ensure that European citizens benefit from the transformation and investment at all levels, from the local to the continental – and know it.  That is what, in principle, the Energy Union can deliver; and what effective governance of Europe’s energy transition most needs to provide.

Source: Ofgem

This post draws upon a commentary by Michael Grubb published in the Guardian and Euractiv.  In addition to papers in the CP Journal Special Issue it draws upon papers for the UCL European Institute, Brexit and Energy: cost, security and climate policy implications , and UCL Institute for Sustainable Resource on Brexit, and  The costs and benefits of EU energy and climate policy.

Michael Grubb is Professor of International Energy and Climate Change Policy at the Institute for Sustainable Resources of University College London (UCL), has been Senior Advisor to the UK Energy Regulator Ofgem and served on the statutory UK Climate Change Committee.

Kacper Szulecki, Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, guest editor of this month’s Special Issue. He is a member of editorial teams at “Energy Research and Social Science” as well as the Polish weekly “Kultura Liberalna”, where he comments on international politics, energy and climate.

Kyoto Protocol Countries Achieved Full Compliance with Targets

By Michael Grubb

All 36 countries that committed to emission caps under the Kyoto Protocol on climate change complied with their commitments, according to a scientific study by Igor Shishlov and others published today in the Climate Policy Journal, which uses the final data for national greenhouse gas emissions and exchanges in carbon credits (which only became available at the end of 2015). Nine of the 36 used Kyoto’s ‘flexibility’ mechanisms to comply.

An extended Climate Policy Editorial discusses some of the implications and lessons. It concludes that the Protocol did have substantial impact in the countries that remained (after US non-participation and the withdrawal of Canada). Emissions in both the EU and Japan during the Kyoto compliance period (2008-12) were at least 20% lower than central projections made after the Protocol was adopted in 1997.  The paper concludes that the countries signed up to the Protocol collectively surpassed their commitment to a degree larger than the ‘hot air’ reductions as a result of economic transition in Russia, Ukraine and others.

Achieving these commitments – indeed, with substantial over-achievement in Europe – cost less than 0.1% of GDP for the European Union and an even lower fraction of Japan’s GDP. This is around one quarter to one tenth of what many experts at the time had estimated compliance would cost.

The Editorial argues that the efforts made by the EU, Japan and others demonstrate the extent to which international legal commitments matter, and discusses briefly the relationships between Kyoto and the Paris Agreement. The fact that participating countries fully complied with Kyoto’s targets is highly significant, and helps to raise expectations for full adherence to the Paris Agreement.

In addition to the source articles, a shortened form of the Editorial has been posted on Climate Home.